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1.  Introduction  
 
  European Welfare States are characterized by dual labour markets. Unskilled 
workers are typically unionized, while skilled workers often negotiate on their wages 
individually, and, thus, face more competitive wage formation.
1 Historically, labour 
unions have been able to push for relatively high wages of unskilled workers, at the 
cost of a higher unemployment in Continental Europe than in the United States.  
During the late 20
th century and this decade, globalization has put the European 
welfare  model under increasing pressure.  Wage differences across countries 
constitute a central explanation for the increasing dominant business practice of 
international outsourcing across a wide range of industries (see e.g. Sinn (2007) for 
an overview and Stefanova (2006)) concerning the East-West dichotomy of 
outsourcing).  
Outsourcing can take two alternative forms. Firms may write long-term 
contracts that fix the amount of outsourcing before the trade union sets the wage, i.e. 
strategic outsourcing, or alternatively firms may be flexible enough to decide upon 
the amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously with domestic labour demand after 
the domestic wage is set by the trade union. 
While there is a large literature on international outsourcing, only a few 
contributions have studied the various effects of wage taxation in its presence. 
Koskela and Schöb (2009) analyze in the case of monopoly trade union the impacts 
of labour tax policy reforms in the presence of both strategic and flexible outsourcing 
when domestic labour is homogeneous. This paper opens a new research theme by 
analyzing the effects of wage taxation with flexible international outsourcing when 
the domestic labour market is heterogeneous so that labor markets are imperfectly 
competitive in the case of low-skilled workers when monopoly trade union decides 
the wage rate of low-skilled workers, and perfectly competitive in the case of high-
                                                 
1            We use the term unskilled workers as a shorthand notation to denote workers with less 
qualifications than skilled workers. In practise, these may also be skilled but just less skilled 
workers.   3
skilled workers os that the high-skilled wage adjust to equalize labor demand and 
labor supply by also assuming CES-utility function which depends on the elasticity 
of substitution between consumption and leisure for high-skilled workers. We 
assume for simplicity that there is the representative firm to allow for different labour 
market situation.
2 
We find that in the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of high-
skilled workers´ CES and in the case of C-D utility function in competitive labor 
market equilibrium  (a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled 
wage,  whereas (b)  the high-skilled wage depends positively (negatively) on the 
wage tax when the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
higher (lower ) than one, whereas (c) the high-skilled wage depends negatively 
(positively) on the tax exemption when the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one, while the high-skilled wage is 
independent of tax parameters under C-D utility function.  Both in the case of high- 
skilled workers´ CES and C-D utility function in competitive labor market 
equilibrium higher outsourcing wage and higher outsourcing cost will increase the 
wage for the low-skilled labor because the wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor 
will decrease and these will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor. 
A higher unskilled wage tax rate will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and the higher unskilled wage 
tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and will increase the 
wage for the high-skilled labour. Similar qualitative effects arise in the absence of 
outsourcing. In terms of labor tax reform (a) a higher degree of tax progression by 
raising the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the 
relative burden per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the wage rate and 
increase labour demand of low-skilled workers,  whereas (b) it will  decrease 
(increase) employment of high-skilled workers in CES utility function when the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one,  
                                                 
2        Other research topic is to focus the role of heterogeneous firms to study the interaction between 
wage bargaining and e.g. foreign direct investment (see e.g. Eckel and Egger (2900) about this 
analysis but in the absence of labor market policy reforms).   4
(c)  A higher low-skilled wage tax rate will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and the higher low-skilled wage 
tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and will increase the 
wage for the high-skilled labour. Similar qualitative effects arise in the absence of 
outsourcing. In terms of labor tax reform (a) a higher degree of tax progression by 
raising the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the 
relative burden per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the wage rate and 
increase labour demand of low-skilled workers, whereas (b) it will decrease 
(increase) employment of high-skilled workers in CES utility function when the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one,  
(c)  while it will have no effect on employment of high-skilled workers in  the  case 
of C-D utility function of high-skilled workers. 
Finally, a higher degree of wage tax progression for the high-skilled worker , 
keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker constant, will have no effect 
on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES and C-D utility function. Because 
there are no effect of high-skilled wage tax progression on high-skilled and low-
skilled wage in the case of different tax parameters compared with low-skilled 
workers, there is no employment effects in this case. 
We proceed as follows: Section II presents the time sequence of the decisions 
regarding some policy issues associated with labour taxes, wage setting for domestic 
low-skilled workers, labour demand for domestic high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers, outsourcing and wage setting for skilled workers. We study the segmented 
domestic labor demand for heterogeneous work force and outsourcing decision and 
wage formation of high-skilled workers due to market equilibrium under labor 
taxation in section III. Wage formation by the monopoly labour union for low-skilled 
workers under a linearly progressive wage tax levied on workers is analyzed in 
section IV. In section V we study the impacts of both low-skilled skilled wage 
progression and high-skilled wage progression on wage setting and employment of 
both types of workers. Finally, we summarize conclusions in section VI.    
 
   5
 
2.       Basic Framework 
 
We analyze a model with heterogeneous domestic workers and international 
outsourcing. The production combines labor services by high-skilled workers and 
low-skilled workers. Low-skilled labor services can be provided either by the firm’s 
own workers, or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing. We assume 
that the firms may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing 
activity only after the wage is set by the trade union. Skaksen (2004) has analyzed 
the implications of outsourcing for wage setting and employment under imperfectly 
competitive labor markets in terms of both potential (non-realized) and realized 
international outsourcing. Also he analyzes flexible outsourcing, but in homogenous 
domestic labor markets. Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple 
two-stage game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the labor 
union sets wages before the firms decide on the degree of outsourcing.  
 
The time sequence for this case is described by Figure 1.   
 
                stage 1              stage 2                            stage 3                                                                     




            tax policy        wage formation of      high-skilled and low-skilled labor 
            decisions          low-skilled wage       demand, outsourcing, and high-skilled  
                                                          labor supply & high-skilled wage 
                                                                                                                                                               
                      
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
 
The government sets its policy at stage 1. At stage 2 conditional on policy 
choices by the government, the labor union determines the wage for the low-skilled 
workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for labor and outsourcing 
by the firms. We assume that there are many industries, so that each labor union 
represents only a small fraction of the total labor force. At stage 3, firms decide on   6
domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wages of the high-skilled 
labor adjust to equalize labor demand and labor supply. The decisions at each stage 
are analyzed by using backward induction.  
 
3.       Labor Demand, Outsourcing Decision and High-Skilled Wage    
Formation 
 
3.1.   High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labor Demand and Outsourcing 
 
At the last stage, the firm decides on the high-skilled labor demand H , the 
low-skilled labor demand L and outsourcing M in order to maximize the profit 
function 
 
         ) ( ) , , (
) , , (
M g M w L w H w M L H F Max M L H
M L H
− − − − = π 3 2 1                                 (1) 
 
((here   L w  is the wage for low-skilled labor,   H w  is the wage for high-skilled labor, 
and  M w wage of outsourcing. We assume that while some activities are easy to 
outsource, some other activities are more costly to outsource. Therefore, the marginal 
cost of outsourcing increases in the scope of activities to outsource. To capture this 
effect we model the acquisition of M  units of the outsourced los-killed labor input to 
require an irreversible investment 
2 5 , 0 ) ( cM M g =  with  0 ) ( ' > = cM M g  and 
0 ) ( ' ' > = c M g . This captures the idea that firms make irreversible investment in the 
establishment of networks of suppliers in the relevant low-wage countries. 
 
We follow Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) by assuming a Cobb-Douglas-type 




a a M L H M L H F
− + =
1 ) ( ) , , ( , where the parameters ρ  and a are assumed to   7
satisfy:  1 0 < < ρ  and  1
2
1
< < a .
3 This latter specification means that the marginal 
productivity of the high-skilled labor is higher than that of the low-skilled labor. The 
parameter 0 > γ  captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labor input 
relative to the domestic low-skilled labor input. The marginal products of high-
skilled  labor,  low-skilled labor and outsourcing are: 
H aF M L aH F F
a a
H / ) (
1 1 1 ρ γ ρ
ρ = + =
− − − , ) /( ) 1 ( M L F a FL γ ρ + − = ,and  L M F F γ = . 
The outsourced low-skilled labor input affects the marginal products of the domestic 
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Thus, for this production function the domestic high-skilled labor input and the 
outsourced labor input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic labor 
input and the outsourced labor input are substitutes in terms of the marginal product 
effects of outsourcing. Also one can calculate from the production function that the 
domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labors are complements, i.e.  0 > HL F . Given 
the wages, the outsourcing cost function and the outsourcing tax parameter the first-
order conditions characterizing the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labor 
demands and outsourcing are  
     
                             0 = − = H H w F
H
a ρ
π ,                                                      (2a) 
 











π ,                                                   (2b) 
 
                                                 
3              Ethier (2005) has introduced a partly related Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, 
where domestic low-skilled labor and outsourcing are substitutes and domestic high-skilled 
labor and outsourcing are complements, to analyze the decision between international 
outsourcing and in-house production in the analysis of the effect of globalization on the skill 
premium.      8
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These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-
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Using (2b) and (2c) we have  
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where 0 ,
* * > γ M M
L w , and  0 ,
* * <
M w c M M . According to (4) the higher low-skilled 
domestic wage rate, and the higher productivity of outsourced labor input will 
increase outsourcing, while the higher outsourcing wage and the higher outsource 
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η . The elasticities with respect to low-skilled 
wage, productivity of outsourced labor input, and outsourcing wage in the presence 
of outsourcing are higher than one. Higher low-skilled wage will decrease these 
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. Substituting the RHS of (3) for H  into (2b) 
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so that the low-skilled labor demand can be expressed as  
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H . These are 
higher with decreasing returns to scale. According to (5), a more extensive 
outsourcing activity due to a lower outsourcing cost will decrease the low-skilled 
labor demand, which lies in conformity with empirical evidence.
4 Moreover, higher 
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H , can be written as follows  
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H γ ε η .                                                                           (6b) 
 
                                                 
4        For instance, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level data of the Irish electronic sector to 
empirically conclude that international outsourcing reduces plant-level labor demand.      10
The higher is outsourcing due to various parameter changes, we then have the 
following effects 




































































. These are in conformity with 
empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage 
elasticities of low-skilled labor demand.
5 Also one can show that higher outsourcing 
productivity will increase the wage elasticities, and even more concerning the own 
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The higher outsourcing cost and outsourcing wage will decrease the own 
wage elasticity of low-skilled labor  
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,                                    (7b) 
  
and it will also have the same qualitative effects on the cross wage elasticity of low-
skilled labor, i.e.  
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5         Slaughter (2001) and Hasan et al. (2007) have shown in empirics that international trade has 
increased the wage elasticity of labor demand.   11
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Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (5) into the relationship between H  




a a M L H M L H F
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1 ) ( ) , , (  gives the following demand for the skilled labor 
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L .  These 
elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale, but unlike in the 
case with the low-skilled labor, both the own wage and cross wage labor demand 
elasticities are independent of outsourcing. The higher own wage, and cross wage 
will of course affect negatively the high-skilled labor demand.  
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the domestic 
labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 In the presence of flexible outsourcing  
(a) the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the low-
skilled labor demand depend negatively on the outsourcing wage and 
outsourcing cost, whereas   
(b) both the own wage and the cross wage elasticities for the high-skilled 
labor demand are directly independent of the  outsourcing  wage and 
outsourcing .  
 
   12
3.2.    Wage Formation for High-Skilled Workers  
 
3.2.1    Optimal Labor Supply of High-Skilled Workers 
 
We assume for simplicity that the market equilibrium for the high-skilled 
wage  H w  follows from the equality of labor demand and labor supply in the case of 
CES utility function. First we derive labor supply and after that wage formation from 
market equilibrium by taking the low-skilled wage  L w  as given.  
We assume that the government can employ the proportional wage tax  H t  for 
skilled worker, which is levied on the wage rate  H w  minus tax exemption  H e . Thus 
the total tax base in this case is  H e w H H ) ( − , where H  is labour supply. In the 
presence of positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage 
tax rate  ) / 1 ( H H H w e t −  so that the system is linearly progressive.
6 The net-of-tax 
wage, the skilled worker receives, is  H H H H H e t w t w + − = ) 1 ( ˆ . 
We assume that labor supply of the high-skilled worker H  is determined by 
utility maximization s.t.  C H wH = ˆ . Using the static CES utility function in terms of 
consumption  C  and leisure  H − 1  the labor supply by the high-skilled worker is 
determined by maximizing 
  
1 1 1 -















α α H C H C u   s.t.  C H wH = ˆ ,                               (9) 
 
where  1 0 < <α , and δ  describes the elasticity of substitution between consumption 






) 1 )( 1 ( ) ˆ (
− −
− − + = H H w Z H  the first-order 
condition for labor supply can be expressed as follows 
 
                                                 
6      For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another 
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).       13
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so that we have the following labor supply  
 































H .                               (11) 
 
The effects of the wage  H w , wage tax  1 0 < < H t and tax exemption  0 ≥ H e  on the 
optimal labor supply are  in this case the following    
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δ .                                  (12c) 
 
Therefore higher wage rate and tax exemption will increase (decrease) labor supply 
of high-skilled worker if the elasticity of substitution δ  between consumption C  and 
leisure  H − 1  is higher (smaller) than one, while higher wage tax will decrease 
(increase) labor supply of high-skilled worker if the elasticity of substitution δ  
between consumption C  and leisure  H − 1  is higher (smaller) than one. In the case 
of  Cobb-Douglas (C-D) utility function with  1 = δ  labor supply does not depend on   14
















s H . 
 
3.2.2  Market Equilibrium and Comparative Statics for High-Skilled Wage   
Formation   
 
Unlike in the case of low-skilled workers we assume that the high-skilled 
wage  H w  is determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the 
labor demand function and the labor supply function. Now equality of demand, 
equation (8), and supply of labor, equation (11),  
s H H =
*  gives   
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which can be expressed implicitly in terms of high-skilled and low-skilled wages as   
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In the case of C-D utility function under  1 = δ  equation (14) can be written explicitly 
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In this more general CES utility function case there is a negative relationship 
between the high-skilled wage and the low-skilled wage, which comes via the high-
skilled labor demand, where the los-skilled wage have a negative effect on the high-
skilled labor demand due to complementary of H  and L in terms of production. 
This implies that higher outsourcing concerning domestic labor input will increase 
the wage rate of high-skilled workers because it decreases the wage rate of low-
skilled-workers, which lies in conformity with empirics. It has been empirically 
shown that higher outsourcing will decrease wage formation of low-skilled workers 
and increase wage formation of high-skilled workers, i.e. that wage dispersion will 
increase.
7   
The relationship from the implicit function (14) between the changes in the 
high-skilled wage  H w  and tax parameters are as 
 
                                                 
7         See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel 
(2007), Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2003), Hijzen et al (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger and Egger 
(2006), Munch and Skaksen (2009), Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker and Görg (2008).   16
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                                                                                                                                (15c) 
 
According to these calculations, higher wage tax and lower tax exemption will 
increase (decrease) the high-skilled wage if the elasticity of substitution δ  between 
consumption C  and leisure  H − 1  is higher (smaller) than one, because under these 
conditions labor supply decreases (increases) (see equations (12b-c for details).  
In the case of C-D utility function we have also the negative relationship 
between  H w  and  L w , i.e.  
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. In the case of C-D utility function, there is no effect 
of tax parameters on the high-skilled workers.    17
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the high-
skilled wage determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 2 In the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of 
high -skilled workers´ CES and in the case of C-D utility function in 
competitive labor market equilibrium    
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-skilled wage,   
whereas    
(b)  the high-skilled wage depends positively (negatively) on the wage tax 
when the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
is higher (lower ) than one, whereas  
(c) the high-skilled wage depends negatively (positively) on the tax 
exemption  when the elasticity of substitution between consumption 
and leisure is higher (lower ) than one, while the high-skilled wage is 
independent of tax parameters under C-D utility function.   
 
 
4. Wage  Formation  by Monopoly Labor Union for Low-Skilled 
Workers 
 
Now we analyze the wage formation of low-skilled workers so that it takes 
place in anticipation of optimal labor and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We 
analyze the wage formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg 
(2004), p. 401 - 403 concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines 
the wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house low-skilled 
labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing determined simultaneously and 
of market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w .  It might also be important to 
analyze wage formation of low-skilled workers in terms of decentralized wage 
setting in the presence of flexible outsourcing.  
 
4.1.   Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labor Union 
   18
The market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w  follows from the 
equality of labor demand and the labor supply by focusing the case of a CES utility 
function, presented in Section III. The monopoly labor union determines the wage for 
low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal domestic labor demands and high-
skilled wage and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We assume that government can 
employ a proportional tax rate  L t , which is levied on the wage rate  L w  minus a tax 
exemption  L e , i.e. the total tax base is 
* ) ( L e w L L− . In the presence of a positive tax 
exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate  ) / 1 ( L L L w e t −  so 
that the system is linearly progressive and the net-of-tax wage is 
L L L L L e t w t w + − = ) 1 ( ˆ . The labour tax systems in all the OECD countries are 
progressive and show significant differences in the degree of tax progression.
8 
The objective function of the labour union is assumed to be 
N b L b w N b L b e t w t V L L L L L L L L L + − = + − + − =
* * ) ˆ ( ) ) 1 (( , where  L b  is the (exogenous) 
outside option available to the unskilled workers and  N is the number of labor union 
members. The monopoly labour union sets wage for the unskilled workers so as to 
maximize the surplus according to  
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− − −  (see equations (8), (11) and (14)). The first-
order condition associated with (17) can be written as (see Appendix A)    
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where in the case of CES-utility function   
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. Using the 
equation (14) these can be re-expressed as follows 
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H H H H H t w e t w U . 
Using (19a-b) in equation (18) can be presented implicitly as follows in the case of 
CES and C-D utility functions (see Appendix A) 
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ˆ . The own wage and cross wage elasticities of low-skilled labor 































H γ ε η  (see 
equations (6a-6b). These low-skilled labor demand elasticities are not constant 
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ε ε ε ε * *  depends negatively in the 
nonlinear way on the following variables: the high-skilled wage, the low-skilled 
wage, outsourcing wage and outsourcing cost and the productivity of the outsourced 
labor input relative to the domestic low-skilled labor input.    
The optimal low-skilled wage (20a-b) also the case of the monopoly labor 











































 depends on the low-skilled wage rate in a non-linear way 
so that it cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic low-skilled wage.  
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ε η  and in the presence of 
C-D utility function of high-skilled workers we have the following implicit form for low-
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4.2.   Comparative Statics of Low-Skilled Wage Formation  
 
In order to characterize the effect of parameters on the unskilled monopoly 
trade wage formation it is applied the implicit differentiation. In terms of 
comparative statics of the outside option for unemployment benefit we have from the 
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so that by using  f f L L w b η η / ) 1 ( ˆ * − = this can be expressed as  
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. According to (23) the effect of outside option on low-
skilled wage formation is qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing 


























































. In the presence of 









1 , 0 ε
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δ M A  so that 















Differentiating the implicit wage formation (21a) with respect to the low-
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 which can be expressed by using   f f L L w b η η / ) 1 ( ˆ * − = as follows     
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where  
                                                 
9       Of course, in the absence of outsourcing the mark-up between outside option and wage 
formation  1
0 0 > >
> = M M A A  is higher than in the presence of outsourcing.  
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. These qualitative results are similar in the case of CD-utility function 
when  . 1 ) 1 ( ε
ε
ε ε
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 (equation (7a))  and  equation (15a) 




dwH            
In terms of comparative statics of the unskilled wage tax and the tax 
exemption we have the following results  
 
             0












































η   as   0 > −e bL                             (27a) 
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According to (27a-27b) the effects of wage tax and tax exemption on low-skilled 
wage formation are qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing because 
0
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This is because 
these parameters do not affect the mark-up of wage formation, but have an effect 
only via the outside option  L b ˆ . Of course, in the absence of outsourcing the mark-up 













 is higher 
than in the presence of outsourcing. Moreover, the equations (27a-27b) imply jointly 





 and  0 >
de
dwH   so that the higher wage tax and 
the higher outside option of unskilled workers will decrease the wage for the skilled 
labour, while the higher tax exemption of low-skilled workers will increase the wage 
for the skilled labour. 
                               
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage 
formation in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 3 In the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of 
high- skilled workers´ CES and C-D utility function in competitive labor 
market equilibrium 
(a)  the higher outside option will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labor and therefore decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor and 
these qualitative results are also qualitatively similar but higher in 
the absence of outsourcing, and  
(b)  the higher outsourcing wage and the higher outsourcing cost will 
increase the wage for the low-skilled labor because the wage 
elasticity of the low-skilled labor will decrease and these will 
decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor. 
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5.     Effects of Labor Tax Policy Under Imperfectly and 
Perfective Competitive Domestic Labor Markets 
 
 
Next it is analyzed the effect of labor wage tax progression on wage 
formation and employment by the low-skilled workers and the high-skilled workers 
in domestic labor.   
 
5.1.     Effects of low-skilled wage tax progression on wage and employment  
 
We assume that the tax reform will keep the relative tax burden per low-
skilled worker,   ), ( L L L e w t − constant, which means 






L = −                                                                                     (28) 
The government can raise the degree of wage tax progression by increasing  L t  and 
L e  and allowing change in  L w under the condition  0 = dR .
10 Formally we have  
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Dividing by  L dt  and substituting the RHS of (29) for  
 
                                                 
10       A way to define tax progression is to look at the average tax progression  ARP ( ), which is 
given by the difference between the marginal tax rate  L t and the average tax rate R ,  
. R t ARP L ≡  Tax system is progressive if  ARP is positive and the progression is increases if 
the difference increases.     26
L dt de/   gives  (see Appendix B) 
 























































                                                  (30) 
 
so that a higher degree of wage tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per 
low-skilled worker constant, will decrease the low-skilled wage rate. In the absence 








, but it is 
quantitatively different (see Appendix B). 
Finally, we characterize the unskilled employment effect by raising tax 
progression keeping the relative tax burden per unskilled worker constant to increase 








































* . Dividing this by  L dt  and substituting 
the RHS of (29) for  L dt de/  gives  
 





















































γ γ ε  (31) 
 
so that higher degree of wage tax progression keeping the relative tax burden per 
low-skilled worker constant, will increase the low-skilled labour demand. These 
results (30) and (31) also happen qualitatively in a similar way in the case of 
homogeneous domestic labour markets with outsourcing (see Koskela and Schöb 
(2009)). The qualitative effect is also similar in the absence of outsourcing because   27
the higher degree of tax progression does not affect the mark-up of wage formation 
which depends on the presence and absence of outsourcing.
11  
The total effect concerning direct and indirect effects of changes in low-
skilled wage on the skilled labour demand is zero in the case of C-D utility function 
of high-skilled workers, i.e. 
*
*
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In the case of CES utility function of high-skilled workers we have  
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               (32b)
 
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage 
formation and labour demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
     
Proposition 4 In the presence of flexible outsourcing  
(a)  a higher degree of tax progression by raising the wage tax and the 
tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the relative burden 
per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the wage rate and 
increase labour demand of low-skilled workers, whereas  
                                                 
11             This has been analyzed in the absence of outsourcing under imperfectly competitive 
homogeneous domestic labor markets e.g. in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and in Koskela and 
Schöb (2002).     28
         (b)   it will decrease (increase) employment of high-skilled workers in 
CES utility function when the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one,  while it will 
have no effect on employment of high-skilled workers in  the  case of 
C-D utility function of high-skilled workers and  
(c)   qualitatively similar effects arise in the absence of outsourcing.   
 
 
5.2.     Effects of high-skilled wage tax progression on wage and employment 
 
We assume that the tax reform will keep the relative tax burden per high-
skilled worker,   ), ( e w t H H − constant, which means 







t = −                                                                               (33) 
The government can raise the degree of wage tax progression by increasing  H t  and 
H e  and allowing change in  H w under the condition  0 =
H dR . Formally we have  
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Dividing by  L dt  and substituting the RHS of (34) for  
L H dt de /   gives    






































































δ                       (30) 
 
because the numerator is zero (see Appendix C) so that a higher degree of wage tax   29
progression, keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker constant, will 
have no effect on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES and C-D utility 
function. Because there are no effect of high-skilled wage tax progression on high-
skilled and low-skilled wage in the case of different tax parameters compared with 
low-skilled workers,  there is no employment effects in this case. 
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the domestic 
labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 5 In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
(a) a higher degree of wage tax progression for the high-skilled worker , 
keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker constant, will 
have no effect on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES and C-
D utility function, while  
(b) this higher-degree of tax progression will have no employment 
effects.  
 
6.       Conclusions   
 
Most western European countries are characterized by dual labour markets, in 
which wages of some workers are set by labour unions, while other wages are 
determined competitively. In this paper we have studied an economy in which 
unskilled workers form a monopoly labour union, while skilled workers are 
employed in competitive labour markets. We analyze how the presence of flexible 
outsourcing, which is decided after the unskilled wage is set by the monopoly labour 
union, affects such an economy. 
It has been shown in the presence of flexible outsourcing both in the case of 
high-skilled workers´ CES and in the case of C-D utility function in competitive 
labor market equilibrium  (a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively on the low-
skilled wage,  whereas (b)  the high-skilled wage depends positively (negatively) on 
the wage tax when the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is 
higher (lower ) than one, whereas (c) the high-skilled wage depends negatively 
(positively) on the tax exemption  when the elasticity of substitution between   30
consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one, while the high-skilled wage is 
independent of tax parameters under C-D utility function.  Moreover both in the case 
of high- skilled workers´ CES and C-D utility function in competitive labor market 
equilibrium higher outsourcing wage and higher outsourcing cost will increase the 
wage for the low-skilled labor because the wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor 
will decrease and they will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor. 
A higher low-skilled wage tax rate will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease the wage for high-skilled labour and the higher low-skilled wage 
tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labour and will increase the 
wage for the high-skilled labour. Similar qualitative effects arise in the absence of 
outsourcing. In terms of labor tax reform (a) a higher degree of tax progression by 
raising the wage tax and the tax exemption for the low-skilled workers to keep the 
relative burden per low-skilled worker constant will decrease the wage rate and 
increase labour demand of low-skilled workers, whereas (b) it will decrease 
(increase) employment of high-skilled workers in CES utility function when the 
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is higher (lower) than one,  
(c)  while it will have no effect on employment of high-skilled workers in  the  case 
of C-D utility function of high-skilled workers. 
Finally, it has been shown that a higher degree of wage tax progression for 
the high-skilled worker, keeping the relative tax burden per high-skilled worker 
constant, will have no effect on the high-skilled wage in the presence of CES and C-
D utility function. Because there are no effect of high-skilled wage tax progression 
on high-skilled and low-skilled wage in the case of different tax parameters 
compared with low-skilled workers, there is no employment effects in this case. 
This framework suggests avenues for further research. I only focus on two new 
aspects. First, the resources that domestic firms spend on outsourcing will give rise to 
welfare effects in other countries. This suggests that uncoordinated policies might be 
inefficient from the perspective of society as a whole, and that outsourcing may 
provide an argument for policy coordination across countries. This has been studied 
by Aronsson and Sjögren (2004) in the absence of outsourcing. Second, it is also   31
useful to study what are the implications of various tax reforms in the case of product 
market imperfections, whether due to monopolistic or oligopolistic competition.   
 
Appendix  A:    Optimal Low-skilled Wage Setting under Linearly 
Progressive Wage Taxation  
 
The first-order condition associated with { L b w V L L
wL
) ˆ ( max
) (
− =  s.t.  0 = L π  and 
s H H = *   can be written as follows   
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where the own wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor demand is   
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ε ε ε ε * * . Equation (A1) can be 
expressed as equation (18) in the text.    
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where 0 1 < − − δ ε
H
H . Using (A3) and (A4) gives  
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Therefore, we have the low-skilled wage decided by the monopoly labor union in the 
presence of high-skilled workers’ CES and C-D utility functions 
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Appendix B:  Tax Progression and Low-skilled Labor Demand 
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which gives (30), where the denominator is positive. Concerning the numerator    
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 in (30) we obtain that it is negative, i.e.     
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* < + − − = − L L L L L L L e t t w b w b .  
Without outsourcing we have the same qualitative, but quantitatively different result,  
i.e. 
0 ) ˆ (









































. QED.      
 
Appendix C: Tax Progression and High-skilled Labor Demand 
 
Using equations (15b-15c) and express the denominators as 
[] 0 ˆ ) 1 )( 1 ( )
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we have 
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